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ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the role of board structure and ownership concentration on bank risk-
taking of public listed commercial banks in Malaysia from 2001 to 2012. The study focuses 
on the bank-risk taking behaviour after the major bank consolidation in Malaysia in year 
2000. Using two-market model to estimate the risk of the commercial banks in Malaysia, 
the results suggest that higher ownership concentration and larger board size resulted 
in higher bank risk-taking of the listed commercial banks in Malaysia. Given that the 
board structure is an important element of bank risk-taking, regulators should continue to 
enhance the monitoring of banks (where board size is large and ownership concentration 
is high) to control the banks’ potential for excessive risk taking. 
Keywords: bank-risk taking, corporate governance, board structure, ownership 
concentration, commercial banks
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance issues received considerable attention in Asian with no 
exceptional for Malaysia following 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Cheung & Chan, 
2004). The Malaysian banking industry was severely affected with evidence of 
tremendous increased domestic interest rates, increased outflows of ringgit 
funds, tight liquidity conditions, increased loan provision requirements and high 
borrowers default (due to sharp falls in the value of real estate and equities which 
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were used as bank collaterals) following large devaluation of the Malaysian 
ringgit and the plunge of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Takatoshi & Yuko, 
2007). This had resulted in sharp increase in the non-performing loans from 3.6% 
as at June 1997 to 9.0% at the end of 1998 (Takatoshi & Yuko, 2007). 
Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Malaysia’s central bank (or 
Bank Negara Malaysia) focused its effort on consolidating the domestic banks in 
an effort to restore the financial stability as the financial sector plays an important 
role in the economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001). The central bank’s longer-
term goal is aimed towards building a domestic banking sector that is resilient 
and competitive (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001). By 2001, 50 out of 54 domestic 
banks were consolidated into 10 banking groups, and 94% of the total assets of 
the domestic banking sector were rationalised and consolidated (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2001). In addition to the consolidation efforts, Bank Negara Malaysia 
also implemented various regulatory and supervisory reforms to enhance the 
strength, capacity and corporate governance of banking institutions, such as 
issuing guidelines on credit risk management, introducing credit accreditation 
program, and launching the Enterprise Programme to support viable small and 
medium scale enterprises, among others (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001).
In addition, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
was formed in March 1998 to improve the corporate governance practices 
in the country (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The FCCG focused on issues of 
ownership concentration, effectiveness of board of directors, lack of enforcement 
mechanisms, and lack of responsibilities awareness by directors, among others 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  To date the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
had been revised for three times in view of the importance role of corporate 
governance in firms’ surveillance in long-run. 
Theoretically, the important role of corporate governance is widely 
recognised to overcome the conflict between shareholders and managers such as 
the agency theory. This is especially true with good board structure and ownership 
concentration which is believed to contribute positively to more transparent 
information disclosure about a corporation. Transparency is particularly important 
in the banking industry as it serves as the main channel for monetary policy 
transmission of the economy as a whole. Therefore, good corporate practices 
undeniably contribute towards the stability of a financial ecosystem and the 
sustainability of an economy.  
Failure in the banking system may impede the economic activities and lead 
to major financial crisis. The Global Financial Crisis is an example of the impact 
of the financial industry meltdown effecting economies worldwide.  Therefore, it 
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is pertinent that banks lead good corporate practices especially in the composition 
of board structure and ownership concentration for long-term financial and 
economy stability.  A poor board structure and ownership concentration could 
drive the market to lose confidence not only in the financial industry but also drive 
away foreign investments in a country. Hence, this study focuses on the impact 
of board structure and ownership concentration on risk taking behaviours of the 
Malaysian banks.
Excessive bank risk taking was viewed as a key factor towards the 
cause of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 (Paligorova, 2010). A bank with 
poor corporate governance could cause the market to lose confidence in the bank, 
and this could result in a liquidity crisis, which could in turn pose a systemic 
risk to the country (Htay & Rashid, 2011). Therefore, the risk management of 
the financial industry plays an important role towards developing a robust and 
stable economic growth. Krugman (1998) stated that the Asian Financial Crisis 
was contributed by the domestic banks’ structural weaknesses and the economy 
in Asian countries were further weakened by unsound macroecomic policies 
(including low international reserves holdings, low current account balances, 
weak banking industry and competitive devaluation) and moral hazard. Thus, this 
study further analysed the role of board composition and ownership concentration 
on the risk-taking behaviour of commercial banks in Malaysia. This study focuses 
on equity based risk with the estimation of total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic 
risk of the banks using two-market model. Unlike previous study of conventional 
risk taking that focuses on the accounting based risk, we shift our focus into equity 
based risk because investors and shareholders are more interested in the ability 
of the banks to diversify the firm-specific risk to reduce their total risk of the 
banks and to minimise its market exposure. In fact, good corporate governance 
practices in banks should minimise the market risk of the banks while incurring 
higher bank specific risk in generating higher return to shareholders based on the 
risk-return relationship. 
This study further adds to the scant of the existing literatures especially 
after the banking consolidation in Malaysia that takes place since 2001. As 
there has not been much empirical work done on the board structure and the 
ownership concentration relationship with bank risk taking in Malaysia especially 
on equity based risk measures, there is a need to investigate the board structure 
and ownership concentration factors affecting bank risk-taking in Malaysia from 
the shareholders and investors perspective which had been largely neglected by 
the banking authority. This is especially true when the banks are publicly listed. 
Therefore, this study on bank risk taking using the equity based risk provides a 
better overview not only to the bank regulators, but also to the shareholders and 
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investors. This certainly contribute as a guide for monitoring the implementation 
of continuous measures of corporate governance code of conduct in Malaysia 
in achieving financial stability. Growth of the banks may affect the risk-taking 
behaviour and therefore, proper governance practices must be in place to ensure 
that the industry does not face with the issue of “too big to fail” that would result 
in the disturbances of the payment system and economic as a whole. This further 
justifies the need for this study to be conducted. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA
Poor risk management, weak corporate governance, and excessive lending resulted 
in large amount of non-performing loans (with average non-performing loans as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached 20.8% among Indonesia, 
Thailand, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Philippines in September 1998) and 
insolvent banking institutions during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Dadush, 
Lynn, Riordan, Dasgupta, & Johannes, 1998). The element of poor governance 
was said to be the main contributor to explain the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
(Zulkafli, Abdul Samad, & Ismail, 2005).  As a result, there were a series of 
reforms in the Corporate Code of Conduct in Malaysia. 
Malaysia’s journey on embracing corporate governance began with 
the establishment of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in March 2000 
which focused on four areas, i.e. board of directors, director’s remuneration, 
shareholders and accountability and audit.  Under the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, companies are encouraged to apply the broad principles 
of good corporate governance sets out by the code flexibly and applying common 
sense under various circumstances.
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was subsequently revised 
in 2007 to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, 
audit committee and internal audit. In 2012, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 was issued with further emphasis on strengthening board 
structure and the board’s responsibilities. The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 listed eight principles focusing on establishing clear roles and 
responsibilities of the board, continuous strengthening the board’s composition, 
reinforcing the board independence, fostering commitment for an organisation’s 
members, upholding integrity in financial reporting, recognising and managing 
risks, ensuring timely, and high quality disclosure and strengthening the relationship 
between company and shareholders (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012).
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The continuous revisions of the Corporate Governance Code of Practice 
represent the continuous efforts made by the government to improve and raise 
the corporate governance standard. In addition to the Corporate Governance 
Code of Practice, Bank Negara Malaysia launched the Financial Sector Master 
Plan in March 2001 which charts a 10-year plan for the financial industry with 
the objective of developing a more resilient, competitive and dynamic financial 
system (Zulkafli et al., 2005).  More recently, Bank Negara Malaysia introduced 
the Financial Services Act 2013 and Islamic Financial Service Act 2013 and 
one of its key aims was to further strengthen its regulatory and supervisory of 
the financial institutions. All these efforts are mainly to strengthen the financial 
industry’s corporate governance structure. 
In addition, Bank Negara Malaysia introduced the “Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions” that highlighted the principles of 
corporate governance with more emphasis on the role of board and management 
in June 2013 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013). The “Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance for Licensed Institutions” requires licensed institutions to ensure 
that at least one-third of their board members are independent directors to ensure 
a strong element of independence on the board and there should be not more 
than one executive director on the board to maintain effective oversight over 
management (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013).
In terms of shareholdings, on average the single largest shareholder and 
the five largest shareholders of companies in Malaysia were 31% and 62% 
respectively between the period 1996 to 2000, and this had raised the issues of 
the protection for minority shareholders (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Most of the 
companies in Malaysia are highly concentrated and this increases the risk of 
expropriation from minority shareholders (Khan, 1999). Hence, this motivates us 
to further study the impact of corporate practices and ownership concentration on 
risk-taking behaviour of the listed banks in Malaysia. This is because excessive 
risk-taking resulted in the failure of the banking institutions and also hurt the 
minority shareholders as they are the entity that received the least protection.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section reviews the studies on board compositions and ownership 
concentration in affecting the firms’ performance. In the presence of opacity in 
the banking activities, the boards of directors of the bank play an important role 
in enforcing effective corporate governance (Leaven & Levine, 2007). Pathan 
(2009) in his study of the U.S. banks holding companies strongly suggests that 
strong bank boards with small number of board members and less restrictive 
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board encourage the banks to take on more risk. This is because strong board 
of directors are better at representing the bank shareholders’ interest and this 
motivates the bank to take up more risky activities to generate better returns. 
Similar results are also found by Rachdi and Ameur (2011) in their analysis of 
the relationship between board characteristics, bank performance and bank risk 
taking activities based on a sample of 11 large Tunisian commercial banks from 
1997 to 2007. This is supported by Sullivan and Hassan (2012) who found that 
large board reduced the risk taking behaviour of banks based on a sample of 150 
bank holding companies from 1999 to 2000 in the United States.
On the contrary, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) found that 
larger board size resulted in less effective board of directors due to free-rider 
problems (due to agency problem) as well as difficulty of getting timely decisions. 
As pointed out by Jensen (1993), board sizes which are above seven or eight 
members are considered to be ineffective due to the issues of communication 
and coordination. This will eventually affect the firm’s performance. Yermack 
(1996) found a negative relationship between board size and firm value based on 
a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991 due to 
inefficient use of assets.
On the other hand, the role of independent directors cannot be neglected. 
This is because the independent directors assume the role to oversight and 
monitor the top management of the firm to maximise shareholders’ wealth. The 
use of independent directors is crucial to resolve the agency problems (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 2003).  According to Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), 
independent directors are more likely to maintain proper oversight over a firm’s 
top management as they have the incentives to build their reputation as expert 
monitors. This is in line with Pathan (2009) who found a negative relationship 
betweeen the precentage of independent directors and bank risk-taking. 
According to Pathan (2009), this could be due to independent directors view their 
role as balancing between shareholders’ interest and other stakeholders such as 
regulators and depositors.  
Similarly, Htay and Rashid (2011) also found that higher percentage 
of independent directors would lead to higher risk management information 
disclosure. On the contary, Sullivan and Hassan (2012) found that higher 
percentage of independent directors increases the operational risk and market risk 
of the firms. This contrasts with the findings from Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Pathan (2009) and Htay and Rashid (2011). Increase in operational risk 
could happen when the banks are dependent to higher percentage of independent 
directors. This may due to the independent directors failed to oversight the internal 
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operation as compared to the internal or excutive directors who have more control 
over the processess and operations of the banks. As pointed out by Sullivan and 
Hassan (2012), higher percentage of independent directors in the banks that failed 
to oversight the operation of the banks may wrongly fight for the bank’s employee 
salaries and benefits with the perception to retain better human capital (Sullivan 
& Hassan, 2012).
On the other hand, Dionne and Triki (2005) found that the Sarbarnes-
Oxley Act enacted in 2002 in the U.S. which required a majority of the board 
to consist of unrelated directors has no effect on the corporate risk management 
activity based on a sample of 36 U.S. gold mining firms from 1993 to 1999. Their 
finding is aligned with Rachdi and Ameur (2011) who studied the relationship 
between board characteristics with risk-taking on 11 Tunisian commercial banks 
from 1997 to 2006.  They also found that the presence of independent directors 
within the board has no significant impact on risk-taking.  
The study of ownership structure can be categorised into two categories, i.e. 
the ownership concentration and the type of ownership. Ownership concentration 
refers to the percentage of ownership by the largest shareholders whereas the type 
of ownership are individual, institution, state, foreign or managerial ownership 
(Zulkafli et al., 2005). Large shareholders or high concentration ownership are 
also referred to as block shareholders (Zulkafli et al., 2005).    
Marco and Fernandez (2003) found that ownership concentration increase 
the bank risk-taking behaviour of the commercial banks in Spain from 1993 to 
2000. Leaven and Levine (2007) also found that large owners with substantial 
cash-flow rights have a tendency to take on more risk based on a sample of 288 
banks across 48 countries from 1996 to 2001. As highlighted by Paligorova 
(2010), there is a positive relationship between equity ownership and corporate 
risk-taking where owners have a portfolio of share in more than one company, 
based on a sample of 13,486 firms in 38 countries from 2003 to 2006. Htay and 
Rashid (2011) also found that  high directors’ ownership concentration would 
lead to lower risk management information disclosure based on a sample of 12 
listed banks in Malaysia. 
On the contary, Anderson and Fraser (2000) found that managers with 
substantial ownership took on less risk in response to the regulatory changes 
which were designed to reduce incentives for risk-taking based on a sample 
of 150 banks from 1992 to 1994 in the U.S. Lee (2008) also found a negative 
relationship between ownership and bank risk-taking activities from 1999 to 2006 
in Korean banks. However, there was a positive relationship between insider 
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ownership and capital to equity ratio. This indicates that banks take on less risk 
and change their financial structures toward safer and more conservative financial 
structures when their ownership concentration increases. This is supported by 
Riewsathirathorn, Jumroenvong and Jiraporn (2011) who analysed the impact of 
ownership concentration on risk-taking behaviour of banks based on a sample of 
36 banks in East Asia (namely Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Malaysia) from 2004 to 2008. They found that higher ownership concentration 
reduced the risk-taking behaviour of banks. This could be due to as ownership 
concentration gets more significant, the controlling shareholders are more able 
to exploit minority shareholders and the owners may impose more stringent 
monitoring on managers, thereby limiting the managers’ incentives to take 
excessive risks. 
In a similar vein, Magalhaes, Gutierrez and Tribo (2010) found that bank 
risk-taking varies at different level of ownership concentration. They found a non-
linear relationship between ownership concentration and risk taking in banks of 
818 banks around 490 countries worldwide for the period 2000 to 2005. At low 
level of ownership concentration, the banks’ risk increases through less effective 
monitoring by owners. As the level of ownership concentration increases to 
moderate level, the banks would take on less risk taking activities due to stringent 
monitoring by the owners.  However, at high level of ownership concentration, 
banks would increase their risk taking activities when the shareholders act on 
their own interests on the expenses of minority shareholders which is known 
as expropriation-of-minority shareholders hypothesis. This is in contrast with 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), Lee (2008) and Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011). 
Due to the inconclusive findings on the impact of board structure and 
ownership concentration on bank risk-taking behaviour, we would like to find out 
the impact of ownership concentration on bank risk-taking behaviour in Malaysia 
after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As suggested by Htay and Rashid (2011), 
the board can influence better disclosure of risk management information and 
hence serves as the basic guideline for firm’s performance and sustainability of 
the firms in the particular industry. 
METHODOLOGY
This study employs balanced-panel data analysis based on Generalized Least 
Square estimation to examine the effects of board structure and ownership 
concentration of the commercial banks in Malaysia on bank risk-taking behaviour 
from 2001 to 2012. We employ the market risk components; total risk (TR), 
idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR), and systematic risk (SYSR) estimated using two-market 
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model. This model had been widely used in the analysis of risk-taking behaviour 
of commercial banks. Among others that had used this method in estimating the 
risk factors of commercial banks include Anderson and Fraser (2000), Chen, 
Steiner and Whyte (2006), and Pathan (2009). Total risk is the standard deviation 
of a listed company’s daily stock returns (Rit) for each financial year-end. Total 
risk measures the dispersion of the stock returns from the expected stock returns. 
Besides, it represents the risks inherent in a company’s assets, liabilities and off-
balance sheet positions. The daily stock return is calculated as Rit = ln (Pit /Pit−1), 
where Pit is the stock price which is adjusted for any capital adjustments.  
We next estimate the systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk (or 
unsystematic risks) by applying the two-index market model as previously done 
by Anderson and Fraser (2000), Chen et al. (2006) and Pathan (2009). The two-
index market model is estimated using Equation (1) below:
Returnit = αi + β1i Rmt + β2i INTERESTt + εit (1)
where Returnit is the bank’s stock returns of bank i at time t; Rmt is the return of 
KLCI market index at time t; INTEREST is the yield on a Malaysian government 
three-month treasury bill at time t; α is the intercept term; β1i is the systematic 
risk of bank i and εit is the error term of bank i at time t.  The unsystematic risk is 
defined as the standard deviation of the residual obtained from the estimation of 
the two-market model.
We employ Equation (2) to estimate the impact of board structure and 
ownership concentration on bank risk-taking behaviour of the commercial banks 
in Malaysia.
Riskit = αi + β1 (OWCON)i,t + β2 ln(BS) i,t + β3 (INDIR)i,t  
+ β4 (BankSize)i,t + β5 (CV)i,t + β6 (CAPITAL) i,t  
+ β7 (FREQ)i,t + εit
(2)
Where
Riskit  = Total risk/ systematic risk/ idiosyncratic risk of bank i at time t.
OWCONit  = Percentage of shares held by the top five shareholders of bank i at 
time t.
BSit  = Natural logarithm of number of directors of bank i at time t.
INDIRit = Percentage of the number of independent directors over the total 
number of independent directors of bank i at time t.
BankSizeit = Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank at the end of each 
financial year of bank i at time t.
CVit = charter value of bank i at time t.
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CAPITALit = Bank’s total equity as a percentage of its total assets of bank i at 
time t.
FREQit = The average daily trading volume of shares in a year divided the 
number of total outstanding shares at the beginning of each year of 
bank i at time t.
We reestimate Equation (2) the possibility of non-linearity in the 
ownership concentration which may affect the risk-taking behaviour by including 
square of ownership concentration as stated by Equation (3). 
Riskit = αi + β1 (OWCON)i,t  + β2 (OWCON2)i,t + β3 ln(BS)i,t  
+ β4 (INDIR)i,t + β5 (BankSize)i,t +  β6 (CV)i,t +  
β7 (CAPITAL)i,t + β8 (FREQ)i,t + εit 
(3)
We expect that the square of ownership concentration to have negative 
effect on bank risk-taking behaviour because the large shareholders may be more 
risk adverse in order to reduce their losses and to safeguard the value of their 
shares (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Data and Sample Selection
The sample of this study consists of eight listed banking institutions, i.e. Malayan 
Banking Berhad, CIMB Bank Berhad, Public Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank 
Berhad, RHB Bank Berhad, AmBank (M) Berhad, Affin Bank Berhad and 
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad. In order to analyse the risk-taking behaviour 
based on market model, the study took the public listed entities of the commercial 
banks as a representative of the banking institution. The listed entities of the 
commercial banks mentioned above are Malayan Banking Berhad, CIMB Bank 
Berhad, Public Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, RHB Capital Berhad, 
AMMB Holdings Berhad, Affin Holdings Berhad and Alliance Financial Group 
Berhad.  
The period of study is from 2001 to 2012. The data source that is extracted 
from Bloomberg include daily stock prices, volume of stocks traded, total stocks 
outstanding, total equity of the banks, total assets of the banks and ownership 
concentration of the banks. The data of board size and the number of independent 
directors of the banks are extracted from various issues of banks’ annual reports.
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Definition of Variables
We use board size and the percentage of independent directors to represent the 
board structure of the commercial banks in Malaysia. Board size refers to the 
number of directors on the board. This is done by taking the natural logarithm 
of the total number of directors on the board of each commercial banks from 
year 2001 to 2012. We expect that large board size would reduce bank risk 
taking activities in Malaysia.  This is because in the presence of opacity in bank 
lending activities, large bank board size can impose more effective governance in 
banks. Large bank board size could also provide diversity in terms of knowledge, 
experience and expertise in various fields that could help to minimise the bank’s 
risk.  
Next, we use the percentage of independent directors to investigate the 
impact of independent directors towards risk-taking behaviour in Malaysian 
commercial banks. We expect that more independent boards will reduce bank risk 
taking activities in Malaysia. This is because independent directors rely on their 
reputation as effective monitors in order to maintain their existing positions and 
obtain new positions in other organisations. Therefore, independent directors tend 
to be more risk adverse and impose more effective governance in banks.  
Ownership concentration is also referred to as large block holders (Demsetz, 
Saidenberg, & Strahan, 1997). This study defines ownership concentration as the 
total ownership percentage of shares held by the top five shareholders in a listed 
company, which is similar to a study conducted by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
and Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011). We expect higher ownership concentration is 
related to higher risk takings in Malaysian banks. This is because shareholders with 
large ownership concentration may find it mutually advantageous to cooperate 
with management to take on higher risk taking activities, and this may lead to 
poor corporate performance due to less effective monitoring. Nevertheless, the 
relationship may be non-linear because large shareholders who hold substantial 
amount of shares in the firm may be more risk adverse in order to safeguard the 
value of their shares and to reduce any losses (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
We employ bank size (BankSize), charter value (CV), financial leverage 
(CAPITAL) and frequency of trading (FREQ) suggested by Saunders, Strock and 
Travlos (1990), Demsetz et al. (1997), Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Pathan 
(2009) as control variables in our study. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) found that 
the frequency of trading is a substitution for the speed of new information reflected 
in stock price and therefore, this variable should be correlated with the variances 
in a bank’s on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet portfolios.
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Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Based on Table 1, the mean 
total risk of 1.66% is lower than the reported 2.13% by Anderson and Fraser 
(2000) based on the U.S. market from 1992 to 1994 and Pathan (2009) based 
on the U.S. market with average mean of 2.26% from 1997 to 2004. The mean 
systematic risk of 0.49% is lower than the reported 0.52% by Pathan (2009) based 
on the U.S. market from 1997 to 2004. The mean idiosyncratic risk of 16.68% 
is higher than the reported 2.08% by Anderson and Fraser (2000) and 1.98% by 
Pathan (2009).  
Based on Table 1, the mean board size is 9.854 (or 10 persons) with a 
minimum of 6 persons and a maximum of 14 persons. This is lower than the 
reported mean board size of large U.S. bank holding companies by Pathan (2009) 
of 12.92 (or 13 persons). The mean of the independent directors in this study is 
4.875 (or 5 persons) with a minimum of 2 persons and a maximum of 9 persons. 
The mean of the independent directors to total board size ratio in this study 
is 50.27% which is in line with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
2012.  The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 states that the board 
must comprise a majority of independent directors. The Bank Negara Malaysia’s 
“Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions” states that banks 
are required to have at least one-third of their board members are independent 
directors. The mean independent directors to total board size ratio of 50.27% 
however is lower than the reported percentage of independent directors of large 
U.S. bank holding companies of 64.52% by Pathan (2009). 
The mean ownership concentration in this study is 57.10%. This means 
that the top five shareholders on average own 57.10% shareholdings of the banks 
and this is considered to be highly concentrated. This ownership concentration 
is only slightly lower than the reported mean percentage of shares held by the 
top 5 shareholders of banks in East Asia (which include Thailand, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) of 57.87% by Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011). 
This is because the stock exchanges in the South East Asia such as Bursa Malaysia, 
is dominated by companies with substantial shareholders, who are typically 
government owned or promoted institutions or by families who usually appoint 
independent directors for political reasons, for contracts and contacts, and due 
to their personal relationship with the CEO and other non-independent directors 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Anderson & Fraser (2000)
Pathan 
(2009) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total risk 2.13% 2.2% 1.66% 0.66% 0.45% 3.83%
Systematic risk 0.04% 0.52% 0.49% 0.34% −0.12% 2.16%
Idiosyncratic risk 2.08% 1.98% 16.68% 15.31% 0.64% 116.09%
Board size 9.854 1.542 6.000 14.000
Independent directors 
board size
4.875 1.308 2.000 9.000
Independent directors ratio 
to total board size (%)
50.27% 13.59% 16.67% 80.00%
Ownership concentration (%) 57.10% 19.39% 15.16% 86.72%
Bank size (in million) 115,248 95,009 17,220 494,866
Charter value 1.050 0.056 0.942 1.156
Bank capital (%) 8.32% 1.78% 5.13% 14.41%
Frequency of trading 0.12% 0.07% 0.02% 0.36%
This table presents the results of the descriptive statistics.  Total risk is 
the standard deviation of the bank’s daily stock returns over a year.  Systematic 
risk is the coefficient of Rmt, i.e. β1 in the two-index market model as represented 
by Equation (1).  IDIOR is calculated as the standard deviation of eit in Equation 
(1).  Ownership concentration is the percentage of shares held by the top five 
shareholders of the bank.  Board size is the number of directors on the board. 
Independent Directors is the percentage of the independent directors as a 
percentage of board size.  Bank size is the total assets of a bank at the end of 
financial year.  Charter value is the charter value of the bank calculated (following 
Keeley, 1990) as the book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus 
book value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets.  Bank capital 
is the bank total equity as a percentage of its total assets.  Frequency of trading is 
the average daily trading volume of shares in a year divided the number of total 
outstanding shares. 
The mean bank size is RM115.25 billion (or equivalent to USD32.63 
billion based on exchange rate of 3.5321, i.e. the average yearly exchange rate 
from 2001 to 2012). This bank size is higher than the mean bank size of USD23.66 
billion of the large U.S. bank holding companies as reported by Pathan (2009). 
The mean bank size is also higher than the reported mean bank size of USD16.26 
billion in East Asia banks as reported by Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011).
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The mean charter value in this study at 1.05 is lower than the reported 
mean charter value of 1.10 by Pathan (2009). The mean bank capital at 8.32% 
is lower than the reported mean bank capital of 9.26% by Pathan (2009) and it 
is also lower than the reported mean bank capital of 9.00% by Riewsathirathorn 
et al. (2011). The mean frequency of trading at 0.12% is lower than the reported 
mean frequency of trading of 0.32% by Pathan (2009).
Correlation Analysis
The correlation coefficients between board size, independent directors, ownership 
concentration and bank risk measures are largely consistent with the expectation. 
The correlation coefficients between CV and TR of 0.592 and between CV 
and LNTA of 0.578 are only marginally above average. The correlation matrix 
suggests the study does not suffer from serious multicollinearity problem among 
the regressors (Gujarati, 2004).
Table 2 presents the Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix between variables.
Table 2
Correlation matrix
Variables TR SYST IDIOR LNBS INDIR OWNCON LNTA CV CAPITAL FREQ
TR 1.000
SYSR −0.221 1.000
IDIOR −0.075 0.431 1.000
LNBS 0.003 0.137 0.010 1.000
INDIR −0.151 0.014 −0.035 −0.375 1.000
OWNCON 0.182 −0.015 0.000 0.144 −0.439 1.000
LNTA −0.475 0.475 0.105 0.206 0.297 −0.116 1.000
CV −0.592 0.447 0.193 0.116 0.198 −0.388 0.578 1.000
CAPITAL −0.064 −0.166 −0.254 −0.046 0.150 −0.040 −0.163 −0.181 1.000
FREQ 0.267 −0.085 −0.040 0.001 0.130 −0.295 −0.074 −0.009 0.010 1.000
This table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix of total risk 
(TR), systematic risk (SYSR), idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR), board size (LNBS), 
independent directors (INDIR), ownership concentration (OWNCON), bank size 
(LNTA), charter value (CV), bank capital (CAPITAL) and frequency of trading 
(FREQ).
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The estimated results of the board size, percentage of independent directors and 
ownership concentration on bank risk-taking behaviour are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 presents the estimated results for total risk based on GLS 
estimation.  Based on the Hausman test, BP LM test and redundant F-test, the 
fixed effect model is deemed to be appropriate for Model (1) and (3) whereas we 
used Pooled OLS for Model (2).
Results found that board size is positively related to total risk and credit 
risk and it is statistically significant at 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
This means that larger board size increase the total risk of the commercial banks in 
Malaysia. The result is consistent with the findings by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and Jensen (1993) that larger board size result in less effective board of directors 
as there would be free-rider problems (due to agency problem) as well as the 
difficulty of getting timely decisions. The board size on average in Malaysia is 10 
members. Board sizes, which are above seven or eight members, are considered 
to be ineffective as any additional benefits from increased monitoring gained by 
additional membership will outweigh the cost related with slow decision making, 
the effort problem and easier control by the CEO (Jensen, 1993). A CEO who is 
risk inclined may take the opportunity to influence the board to take on higher 
risk. This may contribute to ineffective management of the board of directors and 
hence excessive risk-taking.
In addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that larger board size 
affects firm’s performance of 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. They attributed this to the higher compensation cost of the board and 
higher incentives to reduce their duties as the size of the board gets bigger. Tarraf 
and Majeske (2010) also found the bank holding companies with higher risk-
taking levels have lower financial performance from 2006 to 2009 based on a 
sample of 74 U.S. bank holding companies. Similar results are also suggested 
by Rashid, Zoysa, Lodh and Rudkin (2010) in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009. 
According to Rashid et al. (2010), higher number of board of directors could 
lead to information asymmetries between the independent directors and other 
directors, which would lead to lower firm performance. The result supports that 
higher board size would have a significant relationship with bank risk taking in 
Malaysia.
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Table 3
Estimated results for bank risk-taking behaviour
Variable Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 2(a) Model 2(b) Model 3(a) Model 3(b)
Board size 0.010***
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.147
(0.108)
0.130
(0.112)
Independent 
directors
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.181
(0.146)
0.166*
(0.083)
Ownership 
concentration
0.039***
(0.009)
0.055**
(0.018)
0.002
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.006)
0.434
(0.276)
−0.944
(0.829)
Ownership 
concentration2
− −0.012
(0.012)
− 0.006
(0.006)
− 1.041
(0.671)
Bank size 0.010***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.001)
0.065
(0.044)
0.073
(0.061)
Charter value −0.046***
(0.014)
−0.045**
(0.014)
−0.019**
(0.007)
−0.018**
(0.006)
0.309
(0.434)
0.230
(0.474)
Bank capital −0.114***
(0.028)
−0.111***
(0.014)
−0.007
(0.180)
−0.009
(0.018)
−1.054
(0.850)
−1.289
(1.038)
Frequency of 
trading
4.240***
(0.979)
4.360***
(0.460)
−0.076
(0.477)
0.126
(0.248)
52.298*
(30.095)
42.043*
(19.270)
Constant 0.129***
(0.017)
0.124***
(0.022)
−0.029***
(0.008)
−0.028**
(0.010)
−1.547***
(0.523)
−1.067**
Overall R2 0.332 0.324 0.299 0.302 0.013 0.088
F-test 16.09*** 13.97*** 5.36*** 4.71*** 3.10*** 2.93***
F-test  
(POLS vs. FEM)
7.07*** 7.00*** 0.64 0.58 6.99** 4.09***
BP LM test 0.00 0.02 4.05 1.52 40.65*** 4.30**
Hausman test 48.18*** 34.73*** 1.52 3.81 16.86*** 27.17***
Notes: Model (1) estimates the relationship between board structure and ownership concentration on total risk, 
Model (2) estimates the relationship between board structure and ownership concentration on systematic risk 
and Model (3) estimates the relationship between board structure and ownership concentration on idiosyncratic 
risk. Model (a) estimates the direct effect of ownership concentration while Model (b) provides the estimation of 
non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and risk-taking of the banks.  *, ** and *** indicates 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Robust standard error is reported in parenthesis. (Refer to 
Appendix A, B and C for details estimation)
The results showed that ownership concentration is positively related to 
total risk and credit risk of the commercial banks at 1% and 5% significance 
level, respectively. This indicates that more concentrated ownership increase the 
total risk of the banks. This means that an increase in ownership concentration 
encourage risk-taking activities of banks. According to McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), as ownership increases beyond a certain point, the shareholders with high 
shareholdings will allocate firm resources for their own interest regardless of its 
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impact to other shareholders. The result is consistent with Marco and Fernandez 
(2003) studies in Spain from year 1993 to 2000. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) also found that concentrated shareholdings lead to ineffective monitoring 
due to conflict of interest based on a sample of 347 non-financial and non-unit 
trust main board listed companies in Malaysia from 1996 to 2000.
The study by Leaven and Levine (2007) also suggests that large owners 
with substantial cash-flow rights in highly regulated banking industry have a 
tendency to increase risk taking because of the perception that the bank will be 
bailout during financial crisis by the regulator. Nevertheless, this relationship is 
subject to management structure, bank regulations and investor protection laws. 
Magalhaes et al. (2010) study found that high level of ownership concentration 
would result in higher bank risk based on a sample of 818 banks around 490 
countries from year 2000 to 2005. Based on their argument, high level of 
ownership concentration, banks would increase their risk-taking activities when 
the shareholders act on their own interests on the expenses of minority shareholders 
which is known as expropriation-of-minority shareholders hypothesis.
Paligorova (2010) also found a positive relationship between equity 
ownership and corporate risk-taking behaviour where owners have a portfolio 
of shares in more than one company, based on a sample of 13,486 firms in 38 
countries from year 2003 to 2006. The finding is consistent with McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Marco and Fernandez (2003), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
Leaven and Levine (2007), and Magalhaes et al. (2010). In summary, the result 
support the above hypothesis that high ownership concentration have a significant 
relationship on bank risk-taking in Malaysia.
On the other hand, we found no significant relationship between bank 
risk-taking with the independent directors of the banks in Malaysia. The result is 
consistent with the study by Bhagat and Bernard (1999) that found no empirical 
support that higher board independence correlates with higher firm performance 
based on a sample of 205 large U.S. public companies from 1988 to 1991. In a 
similar vein, Dionne and Triki (2005) also found a majority of the board to consist 
of unrelated directors has no effect on the corporate risk management activity 
based on a sample of 36 U.S. gold mining firms from 1993 to 1999.  
In Malaysia, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that boards which consists 
a majority of independent directors do not affect firm performance. This could be 
due to Malaysia is a developing country where independent directors are selected 
more often for political reasons, for contacts and contracts, and not due to their 
expertise and experience (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). In addition, they discussed 
that the selection of independent directors which were not based on expertise 
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and experience would result in directors who are not able to perform their roles 
effectively and may be unable to perform independent monitoring role.  
This is supported by Rashid et al. (2010) who found that independent 
directors do not add value to firm economic performance based on a sample of 
274 non-financial firms in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009. It is also possible that 
independent directors have personal relationships with the CEO and other non-
independent directors prior to their appointment as independent directors (Rashid 
et al., 2010).  Similar results were found by Rachdi and Ameur (2011) based on 
a sample of 11 large Tunisian commercial banks from 1997 to 2006. The finding 
that independent directors do not affect firm performance was consistent with 
Bhagat and Bernard (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Dionne and Triki 
(2005), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Rashid et al. (2010).
Our results suggest that bank size is positively related to the bank risk-
taking behaviour of the commercial banks in Malaysia and it is statistically 
significant at 1% significance level for both total risk, systematic risk and credit 
risk. As pointed out by Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade and Song (2013), larger banks are 
better off in terms of risk management and hence can assume higher risky asset in 
their portfolio with more lending activities which increased the overall risk of the 
banks. Besides, Mishkin (1999) pointed out that larger banks were more likely to 
be bailed out by the government and this led to moral hazard in the large banks 
and this might also be reflected in the overall risk profile of the banks. 
We found that charter value and bank capital are negatively related to 
the bank’s total risk and systematic risk.  This result is consistent with Pathan 
(2009) and Rachdi and Ameur (2011). Kochubey and Kowalczky (2014) found 
an inverse relationship between banks’ capital level and risk-taking based on a 
panel dataset of U.S. commercial banks from 2001 to 2009. In a similar vein, 
Deelchand and Padgett (2009) found a negative relationship between bank capital 
and bank risk-taking based on a sample of 263 Japanese cooperative banks from 
2003 to 2006. Moussa (2015) also found a negative relationship between bank 
capital and bank risk-taking based on a  sample of 18 banks in Tunisia from 2000 
to 2010. Furlong and Kwan (2005) found a strong negative relationship between 
bank charter value and bank risk-taking in particular during the earlier periods of 
1986 to 2003 as the average charter value of the banks were relatively low.  
Frequency of trading is found to be positively related to total risk and 
also the idiosyncratic risk of the banks which suggest that more transactions of 
the banking stock increase the risk of the banks. This indicates that the greater the 
speed at which new information is reflected in the stock price, the higher the bank 
risk. The result is supported by Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Pathan (2009).
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Negative relationship is found between bank capital and total risk. This 
indicates that highly capitalised banks have lower bank risk. This could be due to 
banks with higher capital would be in a better position to withstand any unforeseen 
circumstances, have better liquidity and are able to quickly draw on their capital 
should the need arise.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the relationship between ownership concentration, board 
size and independent directors and risk-taking behaviours in Malaysian banks. 
Ownership concentration is measured as the total ownership percentage of share 
held by the top five shareholders in a bank. Board size refers to the number of 
directors on the board. Independent directors are measured by the percentage of 
independent directors to the total number of directors on the board.  
The total risk (TR), systematic risk (SYSR) and idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR) 
are estimated using the market model. The impact of the ownership concentration, 
board size and independent directors on the bank risk is then estimated based 
on GLS estimation. The sample of this study consists of eight listed banks in 
Malaysia, namely, Malayan Banking Berhad, CIMB Bank Berhad, Public Bank 
Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, RHB Bank Berhad, AmBank (M) Berhad, 
Affin Bank Berhad and Alliance Bank Berhad. The period of study is from 2001 
to 2012.  
The study found that ownership concentration has a significant positive 
relationship with the total risk of the banks. This result was consistent with 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Marco and Fernandez (2003), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Leaven and Levine (2007), Magalhaes et al. (2010) and Paligorova (2010). 
The study also suggest non-linear relationship of ownership concentration with 
bank credit risk as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). 
The study suggests that board size has a significant positive relationship 
with total risk taking of the banks. The result is consistent with Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Rashid et al. (2010), and Tarraf and Majeske (2010). 
Contary to expectation, there is no significant impact of the presence 
independent directors to the risk taking behaviour of banks. The result is supported 
by Bhagat and Bernard (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Dionne and Triki 
(2005), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Rashid et al. (2010), and Rachdi and Ameur 
(2011). The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 recommend that the 
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board must comprise of a majority of independent directors. This may not be 
effective if the independent directors are appointed based on political reasons, for 
contracts and due to their personal relationship with the CEO and other executive 
directors especially in developing countries such as Malaysia. Therefore, the 
contributions of independent directors may not be significant and effective in 
monitoring and advicing the company accordingly.
As concluding remark, the findings in this study implied that bank board 
size and ownership concentration are important determinants of bank risk-
taking behaviour while the percentage of independent directors is statistically 
insignificant. Given that the board structure is an important element of bank risk-
taking, regulators should continue to enhance the monitoring of banks (where 
bank size is large and ownership concentration is high) to control the banks’ 
potential for excessive risk taking.
This study covered the general perspective of the role of board of 
directors and ownership concentration on bank risk-taking in Malaysia. We 
suggest that future research could extensively look at various aspects of corporate 
governance which include characteristics of board remuneration; independent 
directors tenure; board professionalism or qualifications; and risk management 
information disclosure. Future studies could also analyse bank risk-taking from 
the risk adjusted return of bank perspective.
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APPENDIX A 
Regression model for total risk
Variable
Model (a) Model (b)
POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect
Board size 0.005
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
0.006
(0.006)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.006
(0.006)
Independent 
directors
0.004
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.005)
0.004
(0.002)
0.005
(0.004)
0.004*
(0.002)
Ownership 
concentration
0.002
(0.003)
0.039***
(0.009)
0.002
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.017)
0.055**
(0.018)
−0.004
(0.017)
Ownership 
concentration2
− − − 0.006
(0.017)
−0.012
(0.012)
0.006
(0.017)
Bank size 0.002***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
Charter value −0.059***
(0.012)
−0.046***
(0.014)
−0.059***
(0.012)
−0.059***
(0.012)
−0.045**
(0.014)
−0.059***
(0.012)
Bank capital −0.075**
(0.030)
−0.114***
(0.028)
−0.075**
(0.030)
−0.077**
(0.031)
−0.111***
(0.014)
−0.077**
(0.031)
Frequency of 
trading
2.409***
(0.792)
4.240***
(0.979)
2.409***
(0.792)
2.605***
(0.393)
4.360***
(0.459)
2.605***
(0.393)
Constant 0.090***
(0.140)
0.129***
(0.017)
0.090***
(0.140)
0.091***
(0.013)
0.124***
(0.022)
0.091***
(0.013)
Overall R2 0.487 0.332 0.487 0.488 0.324 0.488
F-test 11.92 16.09 83.05*** 10.34*** 13.97*** 82.74***
F-test (POLS vs. 
FEM) 
7.07** 7.00***
BP LM test 0.00 0.02
Hausman test 48.18*** 34.73***
Notes: Model (a) estimates the direct effect of ownership concentration and Model (b) estimates the non-linear relationship of 
ownership concentration. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Robust standard error is stated in parenthesis.
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APPENDIX B
Regression model for market risk
Variable
Model (a) Model (b)
POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect
Board size −0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)
−0.000
(0.003)
Independent 
directors
−0.003
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.004)
Ownership 
concentration
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.007)
0.002
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.006)
0.006
(0.020)
−0.004
(0.006)
Ownership 
concentration2
− − − 0.006
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.016)
0.006
(0.006)
Bank size 0.001***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.001)
Charter value −0.019**
(0.007)
−0.026**
(0.011)
−0.019**
(0.007)
−0.018**
(0.006)
−0.026**
(0.009)
−0.018***
(0.006)
Bank capital −0.007
(0.180)
−0.007
(0.021)
−0.007
(0.018)
−0.009
(0.018)
−0.007
(0.020)
−0.009
(0.018)
Frequency of 
trading
−0.076
(0.477)
0.046
(0.728)
−0.076
(0.477)
0.126
(0.248)
0.080
(0.393)
0.126
(0.248)
Constant −0.029***
(0.008)
−0.029**
(0.013)
−0.029***
(0.008)
−0.028**
(0.010)
−0.031
(0.022)
−0.028
(0.010)
Overall R2 0.299 0.260 0.299 0.302 0.260 0.302
F-test 5.36*** 1.62 38.90*** 4.71*** 1.40 37.65***
F-test (POLS vs. 
FEM)
0.64 0.58
BP LM test 4.05 1.52
Hausman test 1.52 3.81
Notes: Model (a) estimates the direct effect of ownership concentration and Model (b) estimates the non-linear relationship of 
ownership concentration. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Robust standard error is stated in parenthesis.
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APPENDIX C
Regression model for idiosyncratic risk
Variable
Model (a) Model (b)
POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect POLS Fixed Effect Random Effect
Board size 0.031
(0.115)
0.147
(0.108)
0.031
(0.115)
0.061
(0.171)
0.130
(0.112)
0.061
(0.171)
Independent 
directors
−0.020
(0.153)
0.181
(0.146)
−0.020
(0.153)
−0.056
(0.140)
0.166*
(0.083)
−0.056
(0.140)
Ownership 
concentration
0.044
(0.103)
0.434
(0.276)
0.044
(0.103)
−1.829**
(0.649)
−0.944
(0.829)
−1.829***
(0.649)
Ownership 
concentration2
1.824**
(0.648)
1.041
(0.671)
1.824***
(0.648)
Bank size −0.006
(0.027)
0.065
(0.044)
−0.006
(0.027)
−0.002
(0.024)
0.073
(0.061)
−0.002
(0.024)
Charter value 0.544
(0.380)
0.309
(0.434)
0.544
(0.380)
0.420
(0.312)
0.230
(0.474)
0.420
(0.312)
Bank capital −1.880**
(0.916)
−1.054
(0.850)
−1.880**
(0.916)
−2.408*
(1.206)
−1.289
(1.038)
−2.408**
(1.206)
Frequency of 
trading
−4.333
(24.285)
52.298*
(30.095)
−4.333
(24.285)
59.487**
(27.020)
42.043*
(19.270)
59.487**
(27.020)
Constant −0.125
(0.429)
−1.547***
(0.523)
−0.125
(0.429)
0.153
(0.782)
−1.067**
(0.406)
0.153
(0.782)
Overall R2 0.246 0.013 0.246 0.246 0.088 0.246
F-test 3.65*** 3.10*** 29.01*** 3.56*** 2.93*** 28.45***
F-test (POLS vs. 
FEM)
6.99** 4.09***
BP LM test 40.65*** 4.30***
Hausman test 16.86*** 27.17***
Notes: Model (a) estimates the direct effect of ownership concentration and Model (b) estimates the non-linear relationship of 
ownership concentration. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Robust standard error is stated in parenthesis.
